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Abstract 
 
  On December 7, 2011, newspaper headlines from coast to coast announced that Plan B 
One-Step, a form of emergency contraception, would not be made available to females under 
seventeen without a prescription.  The denial of over-the-counter (“OTC”) status, though 
newsworthy itself, drew particular attention because of the unusual nature of the decision.  As 
the New York Times announced, “[f]or the first time ever, the Health and Human Services 
secretary publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration . . . . no health secretary had 
ever publicly done so . . . .”
1  This paper analyzes the novel and much-discussed public 
overruling of the Food and Drug Administration Commissioner by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) regarding the prescription-only status of Plan B One-Step for women 
under seventeen.   
Part I begins by briefly detailing the history of emergency contraception from its creation 
through the new drug application process, court battles, and repeated efforts to obtain OTC 
status for Plan B.  In Part II, I move forward in time to the most recent 2011 supplemental new 
drug application for Plan B and the subsequent December 7 decision, exploring in detail the 
declared reasoning of the FDA and HHS, the evidence presented, and the practical 
consequences of the decision for adolescent females.  In Part III, I endeavor to place the 
overruling of the FDA in historical and legal context.  Looking to the statements of former FDA 
employees, I explore reports of previous assertions of HHS authority over the FDA dating back 
to the 1950’s, and I review the legal source of that authority.  Finally, I conclude by suggesting 
that the December 7 Plan-B decision, though unique in its public nature, was in fact consistent 
with a long history of behind-the-scenes HHS influence on FDA decisions. I also argue that the 
December 7 decision can be viewed as step towards more transparent agency decision making. 
                                                             
1 Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled On Availability Of After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011 at A1. 2 
 
Introduction 
  Emergency contraception, for more than a decade now, has sparked intense interest in the 
scientific, political and religious communities, touching as it does on a broad array of topics 
ranging from abortion to sexual health to parental control and more.  To its detractors, the so-
called “morning-after pill” is a moral hazard, a dangerous abortifacient, and a threat to the 
welfare of American families that ought to be restricted to prescription status if not banned.
2  To 
its advocates, the drug is an extension of the traditional birth control pill that offers the promise 
of female autonomy and the safe prevention of unplanned pregnancies
3 such that it ought to be 
stocked on drug store shelves alongside condoms and pregnancy tests.
4   
For the purposes of this paper, Plan B One-Step (“Plan B”) is defined functionally; Plan 
B is a type of emergency contraception
5 taken orally that contains 1.5 mg of levonorgestrel and, 
when taken within three days of unprotected intercourse, prevents pregnancy in roughly seven 
out of eight women who would otherwise have gotten pregnant.
6  It is still contested whether 
Plan B functions solely by preventing ovulation or whether it could also prevent implantation of 
a fertilized egg, though “the weight of evidence suggests that [emergency contraceptive] drugs 
                                                             
2 Deirdre McQuade of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops asserted that Plan B “could endanger the 
lives of newly conceived children through its abortifacient action, put minors at risk for unnecessary side effects, 
undermine parental rights and contribute to higher STD rates.” Rob Stein, Wider access to Plan B is rejected, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2011, at A01. 
3 “Emergency contraception is a safe and effective way to prevent pregnancy after unprotected intercourse. 
. . The morning-after pill is not the abortion pill. Emergency contraception is birth control, not abortion.” Morning-
After Pill (Emergency Contraception), PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-
topics/emergency-contraception-morning-after-pill-4363.asp. 
4 Kirsten Moore of Reproductive Health Technologies Project expressed hope that Plan B “will be right on 
the shelves between the condoms and the pregnancy tests,” arguing that OTC status for Plan B is “good news for 
women’s health and long overdue.” Rob Stein, FDA Considers Putting Plan B in Drugstore Aisles, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 6, 2011, at A12. 
5 I refer to Plan B as a type of emergency contraception rather than an abortifacient consistent with both 
FDA policy and with the definition of pregnancy promulgated by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists.  Because Plan B, like traditional birth control pills, does not affect an implanted, fertilized egg, it is 
properly classified as a form of contraception.  For more information on the distinction between abortifacients and 
contraceptives, see Renee C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of  RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency Contraception, and 
as an Abortifacient under the Law of Contraception, 79 Or. L. Rev. 1121 (2000).  
6 Teva’s Women’s Health, Inc., What Plan B One-Step Is, PLAN B ONE-STEP, http://planbonestep.com/ 
description-plan-b.aspx (last visited May 5, 2012). 3 
 
never work by preventing implantation.”
7  Although Plan B is not the only form of emergency 
contraception,
8 it is the focus of this paper. 
On December 7, 2011, Plan B made national headlines when Commissioner Margaret 
Hamburg of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) announced that “adequate and 
reasonable, well-supported, and science-based evidence [shows] that Plan B One-Step is safe and 
effective and should be approved for nonprescription use for all females of child-bearing 
potential.”
9  For a moment, it seemed as though emergency contraception proponents had 
prevailed and Plan B would soon be available to all as an OTC drug.  However, the 
Commissioner then made a remarkable announcement; Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) Kathleen Sebelius, invoking her authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, had directed the Commissioner of the FDA not to grant OTC status to Plan B for females 
under the age of seventeen.
10   
The December 7 decision exposed – in a very public fashion – the typically behind-the-
scenes involvement of HHS in FDA decisions, attracting criticism from those who argued that 
the Obama administration improperly allowed politics to triumph over science.
11  In the 
subsequent months, law suits,
12 letters from Congressmen,
13 and numerous newspaper articles
14 
                                                             
7 Valerie B. Satkoske, Lisa S. Parker, Emergency Contraception Policy: How Moral Commitments Affect 
Risk Evaluation, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 187, 190 (2010). 
8 For example, certain intrauterine devices like the Copper-T IUD offer even greater odds of preventing 
pregnancy when inserted shortly after unprotected intercourse.  See Judy Mann, A Birth Control Option Worthy of 
Mention, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1997, at E3; see also Kelly Cleland et al., The Efficacy Of IUDs For Emergency 
Contraception: A Systematic Review Of 35 Years Of Experience, HUM. REPROD., May 8, 2012 at 1–7. 
doi:10.1093/humrep/des140 available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/citmgr?gca=humrep;des140v1. 
9 Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg on Plan B One-Step, FDA (Dec. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm282805.html [hereinafter Hamburg Statement]. 
10 Id. 
11 Editorial, Politics and the Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A38 (“Once again, the 
politics of birth control have trumped science and sound public policy.”). 
12 The Center for Reproductive Rights has filed suit in federal district court, arguing that the FDA’s and 
Sebelius’s decision to deny OTC status to Plan B for women under seventeen was invalid. See Rob Stein, Judge 
Rejects Plan B Challenge, May Review FDA Decision, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2011, at A02; see also Associated 
Press, Morning-After Pill Can Get A Hearing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2011 at 8. 4 
 
have attacked the actions of the Secretary of HHS (“Secretary”), the president, and the FDA.  
Papers from coast to coast heralded the action as unprecedented, proclaiming it the first time the 
Secretary had publicly overruled the Commissioner of the FDA (“Commissioner”).
15  As a 
result, many were left wondering if Sebelius’s decision and the subsequent FDA action were 
lawful and, to the extent political concerns governed Sebelius’s actions, whether such 
considerations were appropriate.   
Before one can analyze the appropriateness and historical significance of the December 7 
decision, however, it is absolutely essential to place the Plan B decision in context.  Accordingly, 
this paper begins with a brief overview of the history of Plan B from creation to FDA approval, 
through court cases and multiple requests for OTC status.  In Part II, I analyze the most recent 
petition for OTC status, explaining the review process to which Plan B was subjected, the study 
results presented, and the rationales for Hamburg’s and Sebelius’s decisions.  I also address the 
potential consequences of the decision for adolescent females.  Then, in Part III, I look closely at 
the relationship between HHS and the FDA, analyzing the legal authority upon which Sebelius 
relied as well as the historical role HHS has played in influencing FDA decisions both in and out 
of the public eye.  In this section, I examine interviews with FDA employees and former 
Commissioners dating back to the 1960’s which collectively reveal countless instances of 
behind-the-scenes political influences on FDA decisions.   
Ultimately, I conclude by observing that HHS in fact has a long history of exerting 
influence over FDA Commissioners and regulations, that the December 7 decision was unique 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 “Fourteen Democratic members of Congress wrote a letter asking Sebelius to substantiate the scientific 
basis of her decision.” Jill U. Adams, The Push-Pull Over Morning-After Pill; Obama Administration Keeps Access 
Restricted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at E1.  
14 See, e.g., Editorial, Wrong Call On Plan B, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2011, at A1; see also Editorial, 
Politics and the Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A38. 
15 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at A1 (“For the first time ever, the Health and Human Services secretary 
publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration . . . . no health secretary had ever publicly done so . . .”).    5 
 
only in so far as it was public, and that regardless of whether political considerations ought to 
play a role in the regulation of food and drugs, they have in fact done so intermittently for the 
past fifty years.  Moreover, Sebelius’s overruling of the FDA could in fact be considered a step 
towards greater transparency in agency decision making, as it moved what has traditionally been 
a decision made behind closed doors to the forefront of public attention.   
I.  The Emergence of Emergency Contraception and the Development of Plan B 
 
In the 1990’s, more than thirty years after first approving the use of daily oral 
contraceptives, the FDA began tackling the issue of emergency contraception.  Although the 
FDA in 1994 denied a citizen petition to require labeling for the use of oral contraceptives as 
emergency contraception,
16 by 1997, the FDA acknowledged that emergency contraception 
“substantially reduces the chances of becoming pregnant after unprotected sexual intercourse,” 
and the agency began actively soliciting emergency contraception supplemental new drug 
applications (“NDAs”) from oral contraception manufacturers.
17  The FDA Deputy 
Commissioner at the time, Mary Pendergast, publicly announced that the FDA was “trying to 
pave the way for greater access to emergency contraception,”
18  likely in an effort to encourage 
drug manufactures who feared the sale of emergency contraception would lead to consumer 
boycotts by those who equated emergency contraception with abortion.
19 
                                                             
16 Michele Slachetka, Getting To Plan B: A History Of Contraceptive Rights In The United States And An 
Argument For A Private Right Of Action Against The Fda, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 350 (2007) 
(describing the 1994 citizen petition filed by the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy). 
17 Id. at 351; see also FDA Calls for Applications for Emergency Use of Oral Contraceptives, 27 FDA 
MED. BULL. 27, no. 1 (March 1997). 
18 Tamar Lewin, U.S. Agency Wants the Pill Redefined, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at A1. 
19 For a discussion of the political and legal climate of the time and its effects on oral contraception 
manufactures, see Marian Lee, When Plan A Fails, We Need Plan B: Over-the-Counter Access to Emergency 
Contraceptive Pills (2004), in FOOD AND DRUG LAW: AN ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS (Peter Barton 
Hutt, ed.) (citing Peter Keating, Where Drug Firms Fear to Tread, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 48).  6 
 
By September 1998, the FDA’s solicitation of supplemental NDAs paid off and the first 
emergency contraception kit – Preven – was approved.
20  Ten months later, in July of 1999, the 
FDA approved the original two-pill version of Plan B for use as emergency contraception by 
prescription.
21  The initial version of Plan B, later replaced by Plan B One-Step, required women 
to take two levonorgestrel tablets twelve hours apart and was produced by Women’s Capital 
Corporation (“Women’s Capital”).  Both the original version of Plan B and its current One-Step 
formula have the same time constraints; in order to be effective, the drug should be taken within 
seventy-two hours of intercourse, and the earlier it is taken within that time frame, the more 
effective it is in preventing pregnancy.
22  Specifically, the drug is 95 percent effective at 
preventing pregnancy when it is taken within twenty-four hours of having unprotected 
intercourse.
23 
In April 2003, Women’s Capital filed a supplemental NDA in an effort to switch Plan B 
from prescription to OTC status.  In support of the switch, Women’s Capital submitted Plan B’s 
actual use study data, which revealed that “the frequency of unprotected sex did not increase, 
condom use did not decrease, and the overall use of effective contraception did not decrease.”
24 
The medical community, as represented by the American Medical Association, the World Health 
Organization and others, strongly supported the prescription-to-OTC switch.
25  Moreover, the 
FDA’s own Joint Advisory Committee – comprised of the Nonprescription Drug and 
                                                             
20 Kathleen Doheny, Emergency Contraceptive Opens New Era, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1998, at S6. 
21 Slachetka, supra note 16, at 351; Lee, supra note 19, at 20. 
22 See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
Frequently Asked Questions, PLAN B ONE-STEP, http://planbonestep.com/plan-b-faq.aspx. 
23 The Difference between Emergency Contraception (The Morning After Pill) and Medication Abortion, 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/mar-monte/the-difference-between-ec-and-medication-
.htm (last visited April 15, 2007). 
24 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
25 See Natasha Singer, Contraception Pill Strictures Are Eased by a Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at 
A12 (“In 2001 more than five dozen public health groups, with endorsements from World Health Organization and 
the American Medical Association, asked the F.D.A. to make Plan B available over the counter.”) 7 
 
Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committees – voted in favor of the switch by a margin of 
twenty-three to four in December of 2003,
26 concluding that the drug was “extraordinarily safe,” 
and that it was the “safest produc[t] before the panel in four years.”
27  Despite the positive safety 
assessment of Plan B and the FDA’s history of following its advisory committees’ 
recommendations,
28 the FDA chose to delay its decision on the switch, exceeding the standard 
ten-month timetable for decision mandated by the Prescription User Drug Free Act.
29   
Meanwhile, Barr Laboratories (“Barr”) acquired Women’s Capital,
30 and the company 
submitted a newly amended application in July 2004, this time seeking to make Plan B an OTC 
drug for females sixteen-years-old and older.
31  The FDA, however, rejected the amended 
application and the request for an OTC switch in May 2004, citing insufficient data on safety for 
use by females under sixteen without physician supervision.
32  Significantly, “Dr. McClellan, the 
Acting Deputy Commissioner, did not make the decision on his own. The White House had 
made it clear to him that an OTC Plan B would be politically unpopular and that the public 
‘needed to have the message that we were taking adolescents and reproductive issues 
seriously.’”
33 
This May 2004 decision prompted forty-eight members of congress to request a report on 
the FDA’s decision-making process, and the report released by the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) concluded that process of considering Plan B for OTC status was “unusual,” 
                                                             
26 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
27 Id. (quoted in Vanessa Lu, The Plan B Age Restriction Violates A Minor's Right To Access 
Contraceptives, 44 FAM. L.Q. 391, 403 (2010)). 
28 Gina Kolata, A Contraceptive Clears a Hurdle to Wider Access, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A1. 
29 Marc Kaufman, FDA Delays Decision on ‘Morning After Pill’, WASH. POST, Feb 14. 2004, at A15. 
30 Leila Abboud, Barr Buys Maker Of Contraceptive For Morning After, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1.  
31 See Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA, to Bonnie 
Scott Jones, Esq., Center for Reproductive Rights (June 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/01p0075/01p-0075-pdn001-vol348.pdf?utm_campaign=Google2&utm_ 
source=fdaSearch&utm_medium=website&utm_term=Plan%20B%20citizen%20petition&utm_content=1, at 2. 
32 Id. 
33 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 8 
 
primarily due to:  1) the disagreement of the Directors of the Office of Drug Evaluation, 2) the 
atypical involvement of FDA leadership, 3) the suggestion that the decision was made before the 
application had been reviewed, and 4) the novel reliance upon behavioral factors regarding 
teenage sexual activity to determine the outcome when such factors were not normally 
considered for an OTC switch.
34  Also of note to the GAO was the fact that prior to Plan B, there 
were “no age-related marketing restrictions for safety reasons for any of the prescription or OTC 
contraceptives that FDA has approved.”
35   
While the GAO investigated, Barr submitted yet another application in July 2004, this 
time addressing the FDA’s concern about simultaneously producing a drug that would require 
both prescription and OTC labeling.  Once again, the FDA exceeded the allotted time for review 
– to great congressional ire
36 – and further delayed decision making by requiring an additional 
sixty days for public comment.  This culminated in an August 2005 announcement that the FDA 
faced an indefinite delay regarding Plan B due to logistical concerns about labeling and selling a 
drug simultaneously as both a prescription and OTC product to women based on differing ages.
37  
Of particular concern was how pharmacists would be able to distinguish between age groups that 
could obtain the drug only by prescription and those that could purchase it OTC.   
In the wake of this final delay, several FDA officials resigned in protest.
38  On August 18, 
2006, Barr once more submitted an application for OTC status, this time arguing for OTC 
                                                             
34 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY 
INITIAL OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 
(2005), at 19. 
35 Id. at 6. 
36 The Senate expressed its disapproval of the FDA’s delay on Plan B at FDA Commissioner confirmation 
hearings, requiring promises of prompt action before it would allow confirmation.  See, e.g., Nomination of Andrew 
von Eschenbach and Paul DeCamp: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
37 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
38 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits Over Delay on Plan B, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at A08. 9 
 
availability only for consumers eighteen and older.
39  The FDA, on August 24, 2006, approved 
Barr’s application, allowing for OTC availability of Plan B for users eighteen years of age and 
older.
40  Two years later, in 2008, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (“Teva”) purchased Barr and 
acquired control over the manufacture and sale of Plan B.
41 
  Finally, in March 2009, a lawsuit filed by the Center for Reproductive Rights challenging 
the FDA’s failure to grant OTC status to Plan B for those under eighteen finally concluded in 
March 2009.  Discovery related to the lawsuit had made public the fact that the “political 
sensitivity” of the switch was explicitly discussed by Deputy Commissioner Lester Crawford and 
the FDA review staff, that Commissioner Mark McClellan had spoken with the Deputy Assistant 
to the President for Domestic Policy about the switch,
42 and that Dr. Janet Woodcock, director of 
CDER, said that “a denial was necessary ‘to appease the [present] administration's 
constituents.’”
43  These factors, taken together, incensed Judge Korman, who openly expressed 
his disapproval of the politicization of the Plan B decision. 
In his opinion, Judge Korman ruled against the FDA, holding that Plan B had to be made 
available to seventeen-year-olds OTC and remanding the Center for Reproductive Rights’ citizen 
petition to the FDA so that the agency could reconsider OTC availability of Plan B for younger 
females.
44   Additionally, Judge Korman took the unusual step of finding that the FDA had 
"acted in bad faith and in response to political pressure" and that its age restriction determination 
                                                             
39 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
40 Id.  
41 Shirley S Wang, Teva To Buy Us Generic Rival Barr For $7.46 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2008 at 
B5. 
42 Robert V. Percival, Who's In Charge? Does The President Have Directive Authority Over Agency 
Regulatory Decisions?. 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2521-24 (2011) (citing Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 
527 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
43 Id. (citing Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 530).  
44 Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 10 
 
“lacks all credibility."
45  The next month, in April 2009, the FDA announced that it would not 
appeal the Tummino decision and that Plan B could be sold OTC to those seventeen and older.
46  
Three months later, the FDA approved the current form of Plan B – Plan B One-Step – on July 
13, 2009.
47  
II.  Teva’s 2011 Application for Unrestricted OTC Availability of Plan B 
After three failed attempts to obtain OTC status for Plan B that extended to minor users, 
Teva decided to try its luck with a fourth effort in February 2011 and submitted a supplemental 
NDA “requesting full nonprescription status for Plan B One-Step without an age restriction.”
48  
Having learned from previous efforts and armed with new data, including a study of 335 girls 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen, Teva presented evidence that “between 72 percent 
and 96 percent of them understood the proposed package label well enough to use the drug safely 
and effectively on their own.”
49  In addition, Teva provided the results of a second study of 300 
girls between the ages of eleven and sixteen showing that “they could use the product properly 
and safely.”
50   
The actual use data and labeling data, provided at the express request of the FDA after 
extended consultation with Teva,
51 satisfied the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research’s 
                                                             
45 Id. at 524, 549. 
46 Press Release, FDA. FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B for Women 18 and Older: 
Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under (Aug. 24, 2006) (available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ 
NEWS/2006/NEW01436.html). 
47 NDA approval letter from Scott Monroe, Supervisory Medical Officer, FDA, to Michele G. Walsh. Dir., 
Clinical Regulatory Affairs, Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc., (July 10, 2009) (available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2009/021998s000ltr.pdf). 
48 Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir. of CDER, to Bonnie Scott Jones, Esq., Center for Reproductive Rights 
(Docket 2001P-0075/CP1) (Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ UCM283545.pdf [hereinafter Response to Citizen 
Petition]. 
49 Stein, supra note 4, at A12. 
50 Id.  
51 Response to Citizen Petition, supra note 41, at 8. 11 
 
(“CDER”) Office of New Drugs. An Associate Director of CDER stated in a memorandum dated 
October 4, 2011 that: 
This product is already approved as a prescription product, and thus the safety and 
efficacy in the pediatric population have been established. Additional data were 
needed to support that the benefits and risks would be the same if the product was 
available OTC without a learned intermediary. . . .  The studies provide data to 
demonstrate that women of child bearing potential of all ages can appropriately 
self-diagnose and administer Plan B One-Step in an OTC setting…. The safety 
and efficacy of OTC Plan B One-Step in this application is supported by the 
totality of the data submitted to support the application.
52 
 
After considering Teva’s supplemental NDA and the study data provided, FDA Commissioner 
Hamburg, on December 7, 2011, announced that she agreed with CDER’s findings that Plan B 
was “safe and effective in adolescent females, that adolescent females understood the product 
was not for routine use, that the product would not protect them against sexually transmitted 
diseases [, and that] . . . . adolescent females could use Plan B One-Step properly without the 
intervention of a healthcare provider.”
53  The Commissioner therefore concluded that “there is 
adequate and reasonable, well-supported, and science-based evidence that Plan B One-Step is 
safe and effective and should be approved for nonprescription use for all females of child-
bearing potential.”
54  In other words, the FDA had decided to approve Teva’s application and to 
grant unrestricted, OTC status to Plan B. 
And yet, despite the Commissioner’s findings and the conclusions of CDER, the FDA did 
not approve Teva’s request for a complete prescription-to-OTC switch for Plan B.  By way of 
explanation, Commissioner Hamburg stated that HHS Secretary Sebelius disagreed with the 
FDA’s determination and had invoked her authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 
                                                             
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Hamburg Statement, supra note 9. 
54 Id.  12 
 
instruct Hamburg to deny the application for nonprescription use of Plan B in females under the 
age of seventeen.
55  In a statement released on December 7, 2011, Sebelius explained: 
[T]he switch from prescription to over the counter for this product requires that 
we have enough evidence to show that those who use this medicine can 
understand the label and use the product appropriately. I do not believe that 
Teva’s application met that standard. The label comprehension and actual use 
studies did not contain data for all ages for which this product would be available 
for use. . . . The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services is 
responsible, acting through the FDA Commissioner, for executing the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. . . . I have directed the FDA to issue a complete 
response letter denying the supplemental new drug application (SNDA) by Teva 
Women’s Health, Inc.
56 
 
Effectively, Sebelius argued that Teva’s studies were inadequate to support unrestricted OTC 
availability for females of all ages because the studies failed to include sufficient data on usage 
and label comprehension by eleven-year-old females, ten percent of whom are capable of 
reproduction.
57  
  President Obama, while denying any direct involvement in Sebelius’s decision, said he 
supported her call on Plan B.
58  At a news conference, Obama cited parental concerns and 
“common sense,” saying: 
As the father of two daughters, I think it is important for us to make sure that we 
apply some common sense to various rules when it comes to over-the-counter 
medicine. . . . And as I understand it, the reason Kathleen made this decision was 
she could not be confident that a ten-year-old or an eleven-year-old, going to a 
drug store, should be able to, alongside bubble gum or batteries [purchase Plan 
B].
59 
 
                                                             
55 Id.; see also Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, to 
Margaret Hamburg, Commissioner, FDA (Dec. 7, 2011), available at  http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres 
/12/20111207a.pdf  (“The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that ‘the Secretary [of Health and Human 
Services], through the Commissioner, shall be responsible for executing” its provisions.”) (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§393(d)(2)). 
56 Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, Dept. of 
Health & Human Services, (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/12/ 
20111207a.html). 
57 See id.  
58 David Jackson & Kelly Kennedy, Plan B Decision Gets Obama's OK, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2011 at 6A. 
59 Id. 13 
 
Of course, whether an eleven-year-old should be able to purchase Plan B is a different question 
from whether eleven-year-olds are capable of understanding the instructions and using Plan B 
safely.  Others expressing approval of Sebelius cited similar behavioral and social concerns, 
worrying that OTC availability of Plan B might have facilitated sexual abuse of young girls by 
allowing sexual predators to hide the evidence of assault, that it might have encouraged 
unprotected intercourse among minors, that it might have decreased parental control over 
children’s behavior, and that it might have resulted in increased rates of sexually transmitted 
infections.
60  
  Not everyone was persuaded by Sebelius’s reasoning, however, and critics have 
suggested that her concerns about a lack of data regarding eleven-year-olds served to mask her 
real concerns about sexual activity among minors and the perception of Plan B as an 
abortifacient.  Susan Wood, the FDA’s Assistant Commissioner for Women's Health from 2000 
to 2005, spoke out publicly against the decision, arguing that: 
A review of the data shows that the availability of emergency contraception does 
not promote earlier or riskier sexual activity, but rather can prevent an unintended 
pregnancy if a woman - or adolescent - needs it. . . . [Sebelius’s] fig-leaf 
explanation that there was inadequate data on young teens just doesn't hold water, 
and it is the same false rationale used years ago by those who blocked Plan B in 
the first place. . . . Her precedent-setting action undermines the principles of 
scientific integrity and science-based policymaking - and could pave the way for a 
future HHS secretary to overrule the FDA in other areas.
61 
 
Even assuming that Sebelius’s decision was in fact based upon the scarcity of data 
regarding eleven-year-old users of Plan B and not on political or moral reservations, some critics 
have challenged the importance of the missing data.  The Guttmacher Institute, for example, has 
deemed Sebelius’s scientific argument “specious,” explaining that although Sebelius was correct 
in observing that ten percent of eleven-year-old girls are capable of reproduction, the statistic 
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misses the mark; in truth, “fewer than one percent of eleven-year-old girls are sexually active, 
but almost half of girls have had sex by their seventeenth birthdays, and most of these begin at 
age fifteen or sixteen.”
62  Effectively, the Guttmacher Institute suggests that unsupported 
concerns about the behavior of less than one percent of eleven-year-olds ought not prevent the 
sale of much-needed emergency contraception to the roughly fifty percent of females who have 
been sexually active by the age of seventeen.  
  Regardless of the motivation for Sebelius’s decision, there is no doubt that it will have a 
real effect on adolescent girls seeking to obtain emergency contraception.  As detailed above, 
time is a critical factor when it comes to taking emergency contraception, and the requirement 
that a person schedule a doctor’s appointment, go to the office, meet with and pay the doctor, 
obtain a prescription, travel to a pharmacy and fill the prescription necessarily delays the 
person’s access to Plan B and thus is likely to decrease the pill’s effectiveness.  Add in the 
challenges of finding a pharmacy with Plan B in stock, a pharmacist willing to dispense the drug, 
and approximately fifty dollars for the drug, and the task becomes even more onerous for the 
teenager seeking to take Plan B. 
A recent study suggests that the existing prescription-OTC age divide routinely results in 
an improper denial of Plan B to seventeen-year-olds who are lawfully able to purchase Plan B 
without a prescription.  A survey of 943 pharmacies found that twenty percent of pharmacies 
claimed not to have Plan B when asked, and of those pharmacies with the drug in stock, roughly 
twenty percent told callers posing as seventeen-year-old girls that they could not obtain Plan B 
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because of their age.
63  The misinformation was even more pronounced in low-income 
neighborhoods, where twenty-four percent of pharmacies said seventeen-year-olds could not 
obtain Plan B without a prescription.
64  With roughly a quarter of pharmacies in some areas 
denying seventeen-year-olds Plan B as recently as April of 2012, there is every indication that a 
switch to unrestricted OTC availability could have a major impact on the use of Plan B by young 
women. 
The practical significance of Plan B’s OTC availability comes even more sharply into 
focus when one considers the pervasive nature and the serious consequences of unplanned, 
teenage pregnancies in the United States.  Each year, approximately 750,000 females in the 
United States between the ages of fifteen and nineteen become pregnant, with one-third of those 
pregnancies affecting females seventeen and younger, and with black and Hispanic females 
disproportionately affected by teenage pregnancy.
65  In addition to the direct physical and 
psychological impacts of teenage pregnancy on the mother, “more than two-thirds of those 
teenagers who decide to have their baby will not graduate from high school,”
66 and the cost of 
teenage pregnancies to the government run around seven billion dollars annually.
67  This is not to 
suggest that Plan B is a cure-all that would instantly solve the country’s teen pregnancy 
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problem,
68 but without doubt, access to and education about contraception – including 
emergency contraception – is an issue of vital importance to adolescent female health as well as 
to the economic wellbeing of these women and the nation. 
III.  Executive Influence: Analyzing the Relationship Between HHS and the FDA 
A.  Delegation and the OTC Switch: Understanding The Legal Relationship between 
HHS and FDA 
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
69 (“FDCA”) and subsequently enacted 
amendments, the prescription to OTC switch can be achieved in a few ways.  As was the case for 
Plan B, the manufacturing company can file a supplemental NDA with the FDA’s Division of 
Nonprescription Clinical Evaluation (“DNCE”), seeking approval for the switch.
 70  The OTC 
review process is then overseen by DNCE – a component of CDER.
71  According to the 1951 
Durham-Humphrey Amendment to the FDCA, OTC drugs are defined as those drugs that do not 
require medically supervised use for safety and have not been approved for use under NDAs 
mandating medical supervision.
72   
More recently, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments imposed the requirement of 
effectiveness and introduced the practice of balancing a drug’s benefits against its risks when 
making prescription-to-OTC switch decisions.
73  Accordingly, the FDA reviewing panel now 
considers the ability of consumers to self-diagnose the relevant condition addressed by the drug 
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and to understand and follow the label instructions.
74 In addition, the panel makes an assessment 
of the drug’s effectiveness and safety when subjected to OTC use.  “While not bound by the 
advisory committee's counsel, the FDA almost always follows its recommendation.”
75  More 
specifically, the FDA followed the Advisory Committee’s recommendation “in every OTC 
switch decision between 1994 and 2004.”
76  Another path to OTC status allows an interested 
party like the Center for Reproductive Rights to petition the FDA to make the switch,
77 and in 
certain cases, companies can pursue OTC status via the monograph route.   
The FDCA, which Sebelius cited in her December 7 decision on Plan B, vests in the 
Secretary of HHS the authority to free a drug from the restrictions of prescription status “when 
such requirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health.”
78  This provision is 
representative of the majority of the FDCA, which by its plain language serves almost 
exclusively as a means of granting authority to “the Secretary.”  However, much of the 
Secretary’s authority under the FDCA has since been explicitly and formally delegated to the 
FDA Commissioner and others.
79  21 C.F.R. § 310.200(B) provides that: 
Any drug limited to prescription use under section 503(b)(1)(B) of the act shall be 
exempted from prescription-dispensing requirements when the Commissioner 
finds such requirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health 
by reason of the drug's toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the 
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, and he finds that 
the drug is safe and effective for use in self-medication as directed in proposed 
labeling.
80 
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More explicitly, the FDA Staff Manual Guidelines clearly state that the Secretary has redelegated 
to the Commissioner all “functions vested in the Secretary under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act,” though the Secretary reserves the authority “to approve regulations of the 
FDA.”
81  Thus, while the Commissioner of the FDA has assumed the Secretary’s authority to 
determine that protection of the public health does not require prescription status for a given 
drug, the Secretary of HHS has retained her authority to approve any regulation that the 
Commissioner seeks to pass while acting in furtherance of the authority delegated to her.  As will 
be explored below, the extent to which a given Secretary utilizes her reviewing authority varies 
greatly over time.   
B.  HHS and the FDA Over the Years: A History of Behind-the-Scenes Influence 
By definition, behind-the-scenes influences and pressures are removed from the public 
eye.  As a result, direct evidence of HHS or other executive branch influence on FDA decisions 
is scarce and largely anecdotal.  The December 7, 2011 decision regarding Plan B, therefore, is 
unique in its very public nature.  But is such an exertion of authority by HHS really that unusual?  
Discovery in the Tummino case, for example, revealed evidence of politically-charged 
conversations regarding an earlier Plan B OTC switch and suggested that pressure from the 
White House played a large role in the FDA’s decision.
82  To understand the significance of 
HHS’s influence over the FDA’s decisions regarding Plan B, it is vital to look back in time and 
to place the 2011 decision in historical context.  A careful study of the statements of former FDA 
administrators from the past fifty years reveals that Plan B is not the first product over which the 
                                                             
81 FDA Staff Manual Guides, Vol. II, § 1410.10, FDA, May 18, 2005 (available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm080711.htm). 
82 See Percival, supra note 42, at 2521-2524. 19 
 
FDA and HHS have disagreed, nor was December 7, 2011 the first instance in which the 
Secretary of HHS has overruled an FDA decision.   
According to retired FDA administrator Arthur Chechhi, who worked for the FDA from 
1945 through 1959, the FDA initially operated as a small, low-budget, professional organization 
subject to little attention from the Secretary
83 or the White House during much of its early 
history.
84  Not until the Citizens’ Advisory Committee in 1955 and 1956 did the FDA start 
receiving increased Congressional, public and political interest, and relatedly, increased 
funding.
85  As the FDA began to receive larger annual appropriations, growing from an 
organization of hundreds to one of thousands of workers, it naturally began to have a greater 
national impact and thus to attract more attention from the newly interested executive and 
legislative branches. 
Checchi recalled one of the earliest instances of a Secretary’s direct involvement with 
FDA affairs dating back to 1959 and the issue of cranberries contaminated with aminotriazole.
86  
“For the first time in the history of the Food and Drug Administration . . . the political master, if 
you will, had made an FDA decision. It was the Secretary's Department, I believe that made that 
decision on the aminotriazole.”
87  Wallace Janssen, former Director of the Office of Public 
Information, recalled that the FDA had informed then-Secretary Arthur Flemming about the 
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finding of aminotriazole in cranberry shipments because Flemming “wanted to be informed 
about all of the important developments . . . and then very often he would personally take 
charge.”
88  Checchi was unsure as to whether the Secretary directly overruled the FDA 
commissioner regarding aminotriazole, but he was certain that “the Secretary of the Health, 
Education and Welfare gave the Commissioner a direct order as to what to do.”
89   
Interestingly, the aminotriazole decision sparked similar concerns to the Plan B decision 
regarding the potential loss of FDA independence.  Janssen, when asked for his thoughts on the 
subject, argued that it was inaccurate to characterize the Secretary’s action on amintriazole as a 
sign that the FDA had suddenly lost its independence, saying that the action was in fact largely 
consistent with the FDA’s history: 
For instance, when Oscar Ewing was head of the Federal Security Agency
90 . . . 
he very much occupied himself with Food and Drug matters, to the extent that 
regulations piled up on his desk and laid there for months because he didn't have 
time to get around to read all of them and sign them out. He insisted on doing all 
that.  So, Flemming was certainly not the first of the Secretaries to get involved 
with the FDA's affairs. Further back, Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson
91 was 
another who involved himself. It varies with the Secretary as to how much they 
involved themselves with the affairs of the FDA.
92 
 
According to Janssen, Flemming insisted that the FDA keep him fully informed about important 
agency action via weekly reports, but reasoned that “being the responsible head of the 
department and the chief spokesman of the department, [the Secretary] had a right to know what 
was going on.”
93   
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  Former General Counsel to the FDA William Goodrich also recalled speaking with 
Flemming after an aminotriazole-related seizure, when the Secretary wondered why he had not 
been informed about the issue earlier and asked about the possibility of requiring the Secretary’s 
approval of all FDA regulations.
94 According to Goodrich, he had been able to obtain authority 
for the FDA to issue regulations “without having to go through the Secretary's office . . . from 
either Folsom or maybe as far back as Ewing,” primarily as a result of Ewing’s frustration with 
being required to review countless complex antibiotic regulation papers.
95  When Flemming 
pushed for more oversight authority, Goodrich argued against it: 
I said, "You don't want to do that. It just invites a political intervention in things 
that are not political, and it doesn't assure you anything you can't get through 
proper management of these people that are employees of the Secretary and that 
won't respond. I know from having worked here a long time and knowing the 
people, if you tell them to do certain things, they're going to do it. And you can 
rely just as well on that." 
96  
 
Despite his best efforts, Goodrich ultimately witnessed what he described as the “taking away 
from Food and Drug the authority I got for them a long, long time ago to issue regulations 
without having to go through the Secretary's office.”
97 
By the mid-1960’s, the Secretary’s position of authority in relation to sensitive FDA 
decisions was well established but strongly tied in practice to the preferences of the Secretary in 
power at the time.  FDA Commissioner James Goddard, who served from 1966 to 1968, recalled 
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several occasions where he had approached Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
98 
(“HEW”) John Gardner with politically sensitive issues regarding the regulation of dietary 
products, vitamin claims, and more: 
[I] informed him of what was about to happen. At the same time, gave him an 
opportunity to overrule me if be so chose, but that wasn't why I went there, and I 
said, "Mr. Secretary, I bring this issue to you not because I haven't been able to 
make a decision, but because I’ve made a decision.  I want you to be aware of the 
implications of that decision.  And, of course, if you wish to change that and 
recommend that I take another course, that's another matter. . ."
99 
 
Although Goddard admits to briefing the Secretary on sensitive decisions and seeking his 
approval, he said that Secretary Gardner consistently backed his decisions as Commissioner 
“without exception.”
100  In one particular instance, Goddard recalled making a sensitive decision 
regarding the sale of processed whole fish without asking for the Commissioner’s consent, 
though he noted that he would have respected the Secretary’s position had he come to him and 
objected.
101 
  The relationship between the Commissioner and Secretary changed, however, when 
Wilbur Cohen replaced Gardner as Secretary of HEW.  According to Goddard, Cohen was an 
overly authoritative Secretary who “dealt in political expediencies,” and the clash between the 
two was the primary reason Goddard decided to leave the FDA in 1968: 
The thing that really made me decide to get out fast was I found that Wilbur had 
committed the Food and Drug Administration to position on an issue with a 
senator without consulting me ahead of time, and that was when I decided that if 
politics were going to have that much to say, I couldn't stay on. . . . I ran the Food 
and Drug Administration. And then all of sudden, Wilbur made a decision and 
then advised me he had made that. Now, that was his prerogative, I understand 
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that, but it's poor leadership in that situation, as it was a technical issue. It 
happened to be a technical thing, and he wasn't competent to make that kind of 
judgment. It was made for political reasons only, and solely on the basis of 
political expediency.
102 
 
Although Goddard did not identify the particular decision in question, his complaint – namely 
that the Secretary committed the FDA to a decision on a scientific issue solely for political 
reasons – mirrors much of the criticism leveled at Sebelius’s decision made more than forty 
years later.  
According to former FDA Commissioner Herbert Lay, by the late 1960’s, the FDA was 
dealing with yet another significantly involved Secretary in the form of Robert Finch.  Finch 
adopted a five-day policy which stated that the “FDA had to notify the Secretary five days in 
advance of any drug or product action which was anticipated to cause a public concern.”
103 
Finch’s assertion of review authority caused significant tension between HEW and the FDA in 
April of 1969, when Lay sent Finch a memorandum notifying him of the FDA’s decision to 
remove the ineffective and inappropriately marketed combination antibiotic Panalba from the 
market.
104  To Lay’s surprise and displeasure, the Secretary’s office “suggested” a different 
course of action on Panalba.
105  Lay also remembered being summoned to the Secretary’s office 
in 1969 to present possible courses of action regarding the artificial sweetener cyclamate only to 
have the Secretary make the decision.
106  Lay is “absolutely positive that I was ordered not to 
discuss what happened in the Secretary's Office or any proposed action [regarding cyclamate] 
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with a single FDA member.”  Fortunately, Ley was able to speak freely after retiring from the 
FDA, allowing his experience with HHS’s behind-the-scenes influence of FDA decisions to 
finally come to light. 
By way of explanation for the shift from little political attention to active political 
involvement, Checchi points to a shift over time from career Commissioners
107 to politically-
oriented Commissioners, which he believes resulted in the creation of an FDA that is “really 
responsive to the political party in power.”
108 Checchi’s observations were echoed by Daniel 
Banes, the Director of the Office of Pharmaceutical Sciences who worked for the FDA from 
1939 to 1973.
109  Banes similarly noted a shift over time away from career Commissioners as the 
FDA grew, but he believed it was inaccurate to say that Commissioners of the past were free of 
political influences:   
1 think there have been political pressures throughout the history of the [FDA]. 
The question is how have they been met. . . . Before the arrival of Commissioner 
Goddard, the FDA high brass was promoted through the ranks. And there was less 
of a feeling that political attachments were involved. . . . In the time of 
appointments from within, the feeling was that the Commissioner remains at the 
helm no matter what kind of administration.  He holds the power whether a 
Republican or Democratic administration - the Commissioner remained 
unchanged. But since Goddard's time, the Commissioner has been expected to 
turn in his resignation when administrations change. Consequently, there seems to 
be a political connection between the head of the [FDA] and the Chief Executive. 
And, on that basis, it would seem that there is a political tinge to FDA 
activities.
110 
 
Checchi similarly acknowledged that even in the FDA’s early years, the views of the president’s 
administration were a guiding force for the agency because “you had to be damned sure you 
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didn't offend the boys in the White House. As you were in the Commissioner's Office you were 
sensitive to the fact that the great white eminence sat there and you had to be careful.”
111   
  Five years after Commissioner Goddard’s departure, FDA Commissioner Alexander 
Schmidt made it a point to push back against outside influences on FDA decisions in 1973, 
actively resisting interference from the Secretary and the President:   
One of the things I was concerned about when I went there, was that I'd be 
commissioner of Food and Drugs and I'd be able to run the agency. I talked to the 
people at the White House and I talked to Cap Weinberger and sort of made a 
deal. And that was that I would keep Cap and the White House informed of 
anything they needed to be or should be informed of so they wouldn't be surprised 
and they wouldn't get hit on the back of the head with a wet fish or whatever, and 
I would run the agency well. And in return for that, they would leave me alone. 
And that's the way we operated, and I was very firm in turning back any approach 
to the agency, either from downtown or, on one or two occasions from the White 
House or from the OMB, when they made a move that might "usurp" our 
prerogatives.
112  
 
Schmidt credited his ability to run the FDA generally free from political interference in part to 
the fact that he was a well-respected member of the political party in power, and in part to his 
willingness to stand up for the agency’s independence, putting his job on the line when 
necessary.
113  Schmidt also worked with Secretaries who were either supportive of his work at 
the FDA, like Casper Weinberger, or disinterested, like David Matthews.
114  Since his departure 
from the FDA, however, Schmidt observed a decrease in the Commissioner’s “authority to run 
the agency and make decisions. That has changed dramatically to this day.”
115 
  FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy, who served from 1977 to 1979, largely echoed 
Schmidt’s sentiments, noting that Secretary Joe Califano “had an array of bright young lawyers 
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whom he instructed to kind of keep track of what was going on in the agency, and they would 
often cause us to need to do more explanation than I thought was necessary.”
116 While 
recognizing that the Secretary should be kept informed about the FDA’s politically sensitive 
work, Kennedy argued that “Joe probably could have given the agency a longer leash,” because 
the FDA “needs a certain amount of independence, I always felt. Something I was convinced of 
from the beginning was that it was important for FDA to have independent regulation writing 
authority.”
117 
  Whether it is a product of true change over time or simply nostalgia, the belief that the 
Commissioner’s independence has been dampened with the passing of years or that politics have 
come to play a greater role in FDA decisions is a common one among former Commissioners. 
Frank Young, FDA Commissioner from 1984 through 1989, when asked whether he would 
change course on RU-486 based on differing political views, responded “absolutely not. . . . the 
day you make FDA's approvals political instead of on safety and effectiveness, you have killed 
the public protection.
 118  When asked about the role of politics in the FDA more than ten years 
later, however, Young said he “lament[ed] what I would consider a much more politicizing of 
the agency.”
119 
  Unfortunately, Young’s belief in a non-political FDA appears somewhat divorced from 
the historical record of agency action even prior to his reign as Commissioner in the 1980’s.  In 
1981, for example, the FDA decided to ban raw milk as a potentially adulterated food that 
carried a risk of salmonella poisoning: 
                                                             
116 Interview by Robert Tucker with Donald Kennedy, FDA Commissioner, San Francisco, Cal. (June 17, 
1996), at 6-7. 
117 Id. at 7. 
118 Interview by Ronald T. Ottes with Frank Young, FDA Commissioner, Bethesda, Md. (Dec, 8, 2000), at 
41-42. 
119 Id. 27 
 
Doctors, scientists, and public health officials, including those inside HHS and the 
FDA, made it clear there was no case for raw milk. Alta Dena, however, was 
located in the district of Republican Representative Bill Dannemeyer, who . . . 
took his pleading to the White House and HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler, as 
well as to the FDA. . . . The FDA was ordered off the case. The assistant secretary 
of HHS who delivered the message, Dr. Robert Rubin, wrote that the HHS 
“nonconcurred” with the FDA ban. . . . Hayes made known his recommendation 
that raw milk be banned. But the Office of Management and Budget ordered the 
agency not to act, and it didn’t.
120   
 
In 1985, following similar delays in the regulation of nitrites and potentially carcinogenic 
cosmetic dyes, former Commissioner Schmidt famously told state regulators that "[w]e have 
more politicization of the agency than is either warranted by rational politics or good for the 
American people."
121 
In one of the best-known instances of the executive branch overruling an FDA decision, 
the FDA, as a result of industry lobbying and OMB interference, “delayed for two years the 
decision to require Reye’s warnings on aspirin labels.”
122  Reye's syndrome, a potentially fatal 
disease, was linked by the Centers for Disease Control to the use of aspirin by children in 1981, 
and the FDA then proposed requiring a warning label on aspirin bottles.
123  However, aspirin-
makers vigilantly and successfully lobbied OMB, which in turn “rejected the work that it had 
taken scientists at the FDA more than six months to complete. Shortly thereafter, the FDA 
decided to kill the proposed regulation.”
124  
As a result, it was not until 1986 that the FDA finally issued a regulation requiring an 
aspirin warning label.
125  The delay undoubtedly cost children’s lives when one considers that 
555 children died of Reye’s in 1980 but fewer than thirty-seven cases have been reported 
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annually since 1987.
126  Accordingly, the aspirin case serves as an important reminder that the 
FDA serves a critical function in protecting public health, and that interference with FDA 
functions can have devastating real world consequences.  Unfortunately, this lesson seems 
quickly forgotten.  As recently as December 2008, the FDA acknowledged that political pressure 
from Congress and other sources prompted the Commissioner to improperly approve Menaflex, 
a patch device for knee repair, as substantially equivalent to grandfathered devices despite FDA 
reviewers' conclusions that it was not equivalent and that more studies of the device’s safety and 
efficacy were needed.
127  
Conclusion 
  After reviewing more than fifty years of HHS-FDA relations, it becomes immediately 
apparent that a Secretary’s decision to override an FDA determination is, if not commonplace, at 
least not unprecedented.  As described above, there have been ebbs and flows of HHS 
interference with the FDA coinciding with the changing of individual Secretaries and 
Commissioners, and perhaps there has been a shift towards a more politically-oriented FDA 
given the demise of the career Commissioners. But to say that Plan B represented the first 
instance in which the Secretary of HHS overruled the FDA Commissioner is to forget the lessons 
of Secretary Flemming and aminotriazole, of Commissioner Goddard and Secretary Cohen, of 
Secretary Finch and Panalba, Secretary Heckler and raw milk, and OMB and aspirin.   
  What separates the interference of the past and the interference of the present is the very 
public nature of Sebelius’s overruling of the FDA regarding the Plan B prescription-to-OTC 
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switch.  Those who worry that the December 7 decision could signal the erosion of FDA 
authority and the beginning of frequent overruling of the FDA,
128 would do well to look to 
history and to witness the Secretary’s use of precisely this authority in the past to influence FDA 
decisions behind closed doors.  Whatever one may think of HHS intervention in FDA affairs, it 
is certainly not an unprecedented occurrence of great historical significance.  
Regardless of its historical import, Sebelius’s choice to take a nontraditional, public 
approach to her Plan B decision is ripe for analysis; perhaps the decision was agreed upon in 
advance and Sebelius merely sought to protect the FDA Commissioner from the internal agency 
backlash that would have followed had the Commissioner herself rejected Teva’s supplemental 
NDA.  Under this theory, the overruling allowed Hamburg to retain the respect and loyalty of the 
FDA’s science-minded employees.  It is also possible, though perhaps less likely, that HHS and 
the FDA truly did square off on Plan B and that the Secretary pulled rank.  
  No matter the reason for Sebelius’s public announcement, her tactic has the potential to 
increase transparency in agency decision making.  Rather than allowing politics to dictate 
scientific decisions behind closed doors, a public disagreement may help to segregate the 
scientific mission of the FDA from the political interests of the Secretary of HHS.  Forcing the 
Secretary to publicly accept responsibility for her decision has the benefit of increasing 
democratic accountability as well.  Of course, in order to truly maximize transparency, the 
Secretary would have to openly admit that political or social considerations governed her 
decision rather than use a scientific rationale to mask her reasoning whenever such 
considerations were determinative.
 129  As an added benefit, this course of action would be 
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consistent with President Obama’s 2009 instruction to federal agencies that the preservation of 
scientific integrity in agency decision making is of the highest priority.
130 
As discussed above, there are some indications that social and political concerns about 
the effects of Plan B on the sexual activity of minors guided Sebelius’s decision and not a 
concern about the underrepresentation of eleven-year-olds in usage studies, meaning that socio-
political pressure overwhelmed the scientific record of Plan B’s safety and efficacy.
131  If that 
was the case, Tummino suggests that litigation could eventually force the FDA to approve an 
unrestricted prescription-to-OTC switch for Plan B.
132  Given the speed of the courts, however, 
there could be a significant delay in obtaining that result, and assuming that Teva does not 
submit additional studies regarding eleven-year-old users of Plan B, it could be years before Plan 
B is available without restriction on drug store shelves if it ever obtains complete OTC status.   
Meanwhile, likely due to the Secretary of HHS’s consideration of political and social 
factors disguised as scientific concerns, sexually active low income and minority female 
adolescents in the United States will disproportionately bear the burdens of restricted access to 
time-sensitive emergency contraception.  That fact alone should have made the December 7, 
2011 decision to overrule the FDA on the prescription-to-OTC switch of Plan B a decision of 
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national interest, regardless of whether it represented the first or thousandth time that the 
Secretary of HHS overruled the FDA.   